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Abstract This chapter charts and critically analyses the ethical challenge of assess-
ing how much (and what kind of) evidence is required for the justification of inter-
ventions in response antibiotic resistance (ABR), as well as other major public 
health threats. Our ambition here is to identify and briefly discuss main issues, and 
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point to ways in which these need to be further advanced in future research. This 
will result in a tentative map of complications, underlying problems and possible 
challenges. This map illustrates that the ethical challenges in this area are much 
more complex and profound than is usually acknowledged, leaving no tentatively 
plausible intervention package free of downsides. This creates potentially over-
whelming theoretical conundrums when trying to justify what to do. We therefore 
end by pointing out two general features of the complexity we find to be of particu-
lar importance, and a tentative suggestion for how to create a theoretical basis for 
further analysis.
Keywords Antibiotic resistance · Public health ethics · Precautionary principle · 
Complexity
22.1  Antibiotic Resistance
Antibiotic resistance is emerging as one of our largest global challenges: more and 
more bacterial infections1 are becoming increasingly impervious to antibiotics, 
which increases morbidity, mortality and societal costs around the world.
The evolutionary principle that drives ABR is relatively simple: when popula-
tions of bacteria are exposed to an antibiotic, strains that have acquired resistance to 
the drug (through mutations or through uptake of genetic material) are favoured 
over the sensitive ones. The emergence of ABR on a macro-scale is, however, noto-
riously complex.2 One reason is that ABR is a global phenomenon with a variety of 
causes on different levels and in different contexts, some of which are poorly 
understood.
The most obvious cause of ABR is the use of antibiotics in humans, especially 
when antibiotics are used inappropriately (e.g. when overly broad antibiotics are 
used, or when a patient has no benefit from antibiotic treatment). The use of antibi-
otics in animals, both for treatment and prevention of disease and for growth promo-
tion, also contributes to the problem.3 Some bacteria have the ability to colonize 
both humans and domestic animals, and mobile genetic elements, such as resistance 
plasmids, often move across bacterial species. Hence, there are no firm barriers that 
1 We will limit ourselves here to antibiotic resistance. Antibiotic resistance is a sub-category of 
antimicrobial resistance, which also includes drug resistance in viruses, fungi and other microor-
ganisms than bacteria.
2 World Health Organization (2014). The evolving threat of antimicrobial resistance: options for 
action. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization.
3 Anomaly, J. (2020). Antibiotics and Animal Agriculture; The Need for Global Collective Action. 
In Ethics and Drug Resistance: Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health. Springer, Cham.
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separate the microflora of animals from that of humans. The external environment 
is another source of resistance, both as a transmission route for certain pathogens, 
for example through faecal contamination of water, and as a source for resistance 
genes that over time are recruited from harmless bacteria into pathogens, assisted by 
a selection pressure from antibiotics.4 The need to take into account the interconnec-
tion between humans, animals and the external environment is often referred to as a 
“One Health perspective”.5
Clearly, there is an urgent need to address all of these causes of ABR and imple-
ment interventions at different sites and different levels of organization. However, 
as we will see, securing the evidence required to establish both the effectiveness and 
the risks of such interventions, comes at a moral price. This raises in a straightfor-
ward manner the question of what the criteria of evidence should be for the various 
interventions that aim to fight ABR. This question links the ethical justification of 
ABR interventions to debates around the ethics of risk and precaution. In other 
words, all ABR interventions pose the challenge of what quality of evidence for 
what balance of risks and possible benefits is required for such an intervention to be 
justified.
22.2  Precaution
The notion of precaution is central to much public health and environmental think-
ing. Specifically, when faced with complex and potentially extremely threatening 
phenomena such as a pandemic, global warming or pollution, it makes sense both to 
act in response to them even if there is a lack of evidence, but also to proceed with 
caution when enacting precautionary measures to mitigate or prevent damage.
Scholars of the Precautionary Principle (PP) have worked to express this intu-
ition more clearly, resulting in a generic criterion of justified decision-making and 
policy arrangements that can be expressed in the following way:
... in the face of an activity that may produce great harm, we (or society) have reason to 
ensure that the activity is not undertaken, unless it has been shown not to impose too seri-
ous risks.6
This criterion expresses three basic things: First, the idea that uncertain major 
threats may provide reason for action.7 Second, the contention that whatever such 
4 Bengtsson-Palme, Johan, and DG Joakim Larsson (2015). Antibiotic resistance genes in the envi-
ronment: prioritizing risks. Nature Reviews Microbiology 13.6: 396–396.
5 Boden, L. & D. Mellor. (2020). Epidemiology and ethics of antimicrobial resistance in animals. 
In Ethics and Drug Resistance: Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health. Springer, Cham.
6 Munthe, Christian (2016). Precautionary principle. In: Ten Have (ed.) Encyclopedia of global 
bioethics. Dordrecht: Springer International Publishing.
7 Compare also: “uncertainty should not be a reason for inaction in the face of serious environmen-
tal threats”. Daniel Steel calls this idea the ´meta-precautionary principle´. Note that the vagueness 
of this procedural meta-criterion allows PP to be applied in a large number of different contexts 
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actions are taken must not themselves impose too serious risks or new uncertain 
major threats, and, third, that we are required to demonstrate reasons both why 
responses to threats are motivated and why apparent threats may be accepted. The 
criterion expresses a generic formula, within which more specific PP versions, or 
specific precautionary policy suggestions, must fit in order to be justified. There are 
thus various ways to flesh out the idea that we have reason to take precautions in the 
face of major, but uncertain threats. As a version of PP is specified, it further delin-
eates what can properly be considered responsible decision-making in such con-
texts, not least regarding what is required more precisely to satisfy the requirement 
of demonstrating reasons for whatever precautionary action is suggested.8
One basic assumption underlying PP is that there is a moral price to exposing 
people to risk, as well as to proceed with activities in the face of uncertain risks. 
However, there is also always a price to any precautionary intervention that aims to 
clarify uncertainties and to prevent or mitigate risks: these will always claim 
resources that could have been used for other worthwhile purposes, create risks of 
their own, and delay or stop possibly valuable activities. For that reason, sugges-
tions for precautionary action need to be subjected to precautionary scrutiny too, 
and to be justified it needs to be demonstrated that they incur an acceptable price 
and level of precaution. Particularly in systemically complex situations, the emer-
gence of risks and uncertainties on various levels raises complications concerning 
how to balance the type and severity of the various harms and uncertainties involved.
A version of PP has to set standards concerning when precautionary action is 
required, and what is required of it in order to be responsible. Daniel Steel has 
recently explained this in terms of a ‘tripod’, consisting of a knowledge condition, 
a harm condition, and a suggested precautionary action.9 Variations of how this tri-
pod is construed will affect the price of precaution, as well as the level of precaution 
enacted. A PP version thus needs to specify for (1) any suggested precautionary 
action, (2) what threat is sufficiently serious for such action to be defensible, and (3) 
what degree of uncertainty is acceptable for it. For example, in order to, say, justify 
taking expensive precautionary measures to curb ABR (1), there needs to be a sci-
entifically plausible model (3) in which failure to introduce these measures leads to 
significant economic or health damage (2). Whether or not in a specific case the 
model leading to harm is ´plausible´ and the damage is ´significant´ of course 
requires further elaboration. In any justifiable specification of the ‘tripod’, it is nec-
essary to balance in a responsible way the need for precautionary action against the 
price of precaution.
Although details vary among authors, critical debate on what it takes to justify a 
PP version has led to a reasonably broad consensus on some minimal desiderata. 
These regard that a sound PP must not balance its required level and price of 
and on different levels of organization. See Steel, Daniel (2014). Philosophy and the precautionary 
principle. Cambridge University Press.
8 Munthe, Christian (2011). The price of precaution and the ethics of risk. Dordrecht: Springer.
9 Steel (2014).
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precaution arbitrarily (but according to a general principle that applies equally to all 
cases), that it needs to avoid so-called precautionary paradox, and that principle for 
responsible balancing of precautionary level and price must be proportional.10
PP is arbitrary when it offers no good, generalizable reasons why a specific 
course of action is acceptable or not. If an appeal to PP is used to recommend inter-
vention 1, but to prohibit intervention 2, it should be able to meaningfully distin-
guish between the two measures and show how these are relevantly different. Note 
that the requirement to avoid arbitrariness also excludes treating the status quo with 
special regard: the fact that things are currently done in certain way is not in itself 
an argument for doing it that way.11 It also means that whatever requirements are set 
by the specification of the tripod in a PP, these apply both to uncertain threats in 
order to justify precautionary action, and to the uncertainties of these actions 
themselves.
This links to the need to avoid ‘precautionary paradox’. PP can lead to paradox 
in two related ways: Either its requirements are so strong that it tends to ban all 
options in most situations, thereby undermining any capacity to guide decision- 
making.12 Or it issues inconsistent prescriptions by requiring and banning one and 
the same option.13 It has been a theme among critics to point out how simplistic 
versions of PP may easily become paradoxical in any or both of these ways.14
The desideratum of proportionality follows from both of these requirements. In 
order to avoid paradox and arbitrariness, a justified version of PP must present a 
principle of responsible balancing of what level of precaution is required and what 
price of precaution is acceptable to pay that applies equally to all situations, as well 
as to all options in such situations. Any plausible version of PP will thus offer prin-
cipled grounds for comparing suggested precautionary interventions, or the accep-
tance of an uncertainty or a threat, to alternative options in a unified manner. Such a 
version will express an allegedly morally responsible way of balancing the required 
level and price of precaution. To justify a specific precautionary action in a situa-
tion, it is therefore necessary to point how such a PP version supports it. As different 
situations vary with regard to what options are available, what stakes in terms of 
threats and prospects these actualise, and what knowledge is available with regard 
to these factors, one and the same precautionary intervention may therefore be 
10 Munthe, 2011, 2016; Munthe, C. (2017). Precaution and Ethics: Handling risks, uncertainties 
and knowledge gaps in the regulation of new biotechnologies. Berne: Swiss Federal Office for 
Buildings and Publications and Logistics (FOBL); Steel, (2014).
11 However, there may be good instrumental reasons to be cautious when implementing change in 
a situation of great uncertainty. We will return to that point later.
12 What Munthe (2011, ch. 2) has called decisional paralysis.
13 What Steel (2014) terms inconsistency.
14 Holm, Søren, and John Harris (1999). “Precautionary principle stifles discovery.” Nature 
400.6743: 398–398. Sunstein, Cass R (2005). Laws of fear: Beyond the precautionary principle. 
Cambridge University Press. McKinney, WJ, & Hill, HH (2000). Of sustainability and precaution: 
The logical, epistemological, and moral problems of the precautionary principle and their 
implications for sustainable development. Ethics and the Environment, 5: 77–87.
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justifiable in some situations, but not in others. This regards also what quality and 
type of information about risks and effectiveness we require, and how much of fur-
ther investigation to mitigate uncertainties is needed in the light of that. Precautionary 
requirements will therefore be gradual rather than absolute, and context-dependent 
rather than rigid. Different situations will justify different levels of precaution, and 
different prices of precaution to attain such levels.15
This regards not least the option of postponing a specific intervention in order to 
gather more evidence to ensure its effectiveness and responsibility. Possibly, this is 
the most common type of precautionary measure, familiar from standard regulation 
of drugs and the introduction of novel biotechnology.16 It is also easy to see how this 
type of precautionary action may often be justified on the basis of a defensible ver-
sion of PP. However, knowledge is never perfect, and the option to further update 
the basis of information for assessing the effectiveness and riskiness of an interven-
tion is ever present. So, when do we know enough? How much time and resources 
should we spend on making sure that what we do in order to invoke responsible 
precautionary response to dangers and uncertainties will not in fact worsen the situ-
ation from a precautionary standpoint by invoking an unjustifiable price of precau-
tion? This is a distinct ethical issue that becomes a particular challenge in the face 
of complex and drastic public health threats, such as ABR, where the price of delay-
ing interventions is obvious, and costs and new risks of conducting research are 
salient. If we wait, the ABR problem continues to grow and increasingly threatens 
to overwhelm us, and if we experiment with interventions this will usually create 
new uncertainties and risks of harm. At the same time, unproven interventions may 
both escalate the ABR problem, and expand it to include severe policy failures. This 
takes us to the question of how these stakes, and options of collecting (or not col-
lecting) evidence, should be assessed and evaluated.
22.3  Evidence
Traditionally, guidelines for evidence basing and research in the area of medicine 
confine themselves to clinical trials of biomedical interventions, focusing mostly on 
the immediate somatic effects on individual patients.17 At the same time, as men-
tioned, ABR (and most other public health) interventions greatly surpass that area, 
and mostly occur outside of immediate therapeutic action (although sometimes 
intended to affect it, e.g., those interventions that regard antibiotic prescription prac-
tices). However, the recently revised guidelines by the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) allow for a broader conception of 
15 Munthe, (2017).
16 Munthe (2011), p. 97. See also Munthe, (2017).
17 World Medical Association (2014). “World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: ethical 
principles for medical research involving human subjects.” The Journal of the American College of 
Dentists 81.3: 14
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‘health research’, including the study of any intervention that aims to change health- 
related behaviour on both individual and institutional levels.18 This more inclusive 
conception clearly and significantly leaves room for the gauging of the proper 
amount of evidence for public health interventions.
A starting point for this type of assessment is the recognition of the fact that all 
health research – not only on biomedical interventions – imposes risks on research 
subjects, while the projected aim is to gather more knowledge in the interest of sci-
ence or society.19 A central tenet of research ethics therefore is that health research 
either has to plausibly benefit the research subject, or the societal benefit needs to be 
very large. In the new CIOMS guidelines, the latter is explicitly recognized in terms 
of the “social value” that may be attained by an intervention.20 Furthermore, consid-
erations of promoting trust towards health professionals and the complexity of the 
ethical issues involved provide arguments to treat health research with a certain 
amount of caution.21 To this, we may add the precautionary considerations related in 
the preceding section: while a public health threat may be major and acute, any 
intervention meant to mitigate or prevent it may instead make it worse, or produce 
structural side effects that undermine other types of social goods. Therefore, the 
CIOMS frame is helpful to understand the question of evidence in public health 
interventions, such as the interventions aimed at fighting ABR.22 To establish 
whether the evidence is sufficient, we have to chart the types of harm and uncer-
tainty for various interventions in order to determine whether the expected (social) 
value of the intervention outweighs the value of postponing the use of a new inter-
vention to collect more solid information about it.
This challenge is well illustrated by debates over suggested interventions in pub-
lic health emergencies, such as Ebola.23 When, in 2014, the West African Ebola 
epidemic was finally recognized as a global threat, it was suggested to prevent 
18 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) (2016). International 
Ethical Guidelines for Health-Related Research Involving Humans. Geneva, Switzerland: Council 
for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. http://www.cioms.ch (accessed July 28, 
2017). Munthe, C., Nijsingh, N., de Fine Licht, K., & Joakim Larsson, D. G. (2019). Health-related 
Research Ethics and Social Value: Antibiotic Resistance Intervention Research and Pragmatic 
Risks. Bioethics, 33(3), 335–342.
19 Wilson, James, and David Hunter (2010). “Research exceptionalism.” American Journal of 
Bioethics 10.8: 45–54.
20 CIOMS (2016).
21 Wilson and Hunter (2010).
22 Attena, Francesco (2014). “Complexity and indeterminism of evidence-based public health: an 
analytical framework.” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17.3: 459–465.
23 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017). Integrating Clinical 
Research into Epidemic Response: The Ebola Experience. National Academies Press. An even 
more recent example is the Zika epidemic. See Edwards, Sarah JL (2016). “The precautionary 
paradox and Zika.” Research Ethics: 178–181.
and Glenza, J. “Zika virus: Floridians fear ‘Pandora’s box’ of genetically altered mosquitos.” 
The Guardian, August 14, 2016: https://www.theguardian.com/us- news/2016/aug/14/florida-
keys-zika-virus-genetically-modified-mosquitoes (accessed July 25, 2017).
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further harm by ‘fast tracking’ new vaccines and experimental drugs, thus relaxing 
the demands of evidence required to introduce new medication.24 This suggestion 
was countered by public health officials, who argued that the epidemic should rather 
be controlled by means of proven public health policies, such as proper hygiene, 
surveillance and quarantine.25 Another issue that was debated was whether random-
ized clinical trials could be justified in the context of an epidemic and the extent to 
which genuine equipoise could be presumed. In part, the answers to these questions 
depend on the relative risk to which the affected communities were exposed, in 
another part it depends on how we assess the gravity of uncertainties underlying the 
assessment of these risks and how we value the importance of acting on good evi-
dence in view of those uncertainties. While the question on the evidence of interven-
tions to counter ABR is similar to such debates, the issue of ABR also raises a new 
set of worries and topics for discussion. Specifically, whereas the Ebola crisis was 
unexpected and presented an acute emergency, ABR is – for now – slowly emerg-
ing, albeit foreseen, but nevertheless posing a major and growing public health 
threat. Already a substantial amount of morbidity and mortality is attributed to 
ABR, but this number is likely to keep growing in a way well known to us.
22.4  Justifying Interventions
Since the causes are varied, the fight against ABR takes place in different arenas. In 
this section, we distinguish between various groups of interventions. The first set 
concerns the development of new types of (or alternatives for) antibiotics. Second, 
we consider interventions that target the access to antibiotics by individuals. Third, 
various interventions aim to establish a larger degree of surveillance. Last, we bring 
together various institutional measures to attack the environmental health side of the 
ABR problem, such as the use of antibiotics in animals, as well as emissions of 
antibiotics. In accordance with the broad notion of ‘health research’ introduced in 
the former section, these interventions span a wide array of different actions and 
policies. As a consequence, we will consider many different levels and types of 
intervention; both on the scale of an individual patient–doctor interaction, as well as 
on the level of macro-economic interventions, institutional regulation and global 
health treaties. Varied though these interventions may be, they all share the charac-
teristic of aiming to help curbing – or otherwise fighting – ABR. To what extent it 
can be demonstrated that they are effective in that regard, and to what extent they 
pose risks of their own, determines whether they can be responsibly introduced.
Not all interventions in the fight against ABR are new. In fact, a number of 
important interventions intended to counter ABR belong to the classic public health 
24 Geisbert, Thomas W. (2015). “Emergency treatment for exposure to Ebola virus: the need to fast-
track promising vaccines.” Jama 313.12: 1221–1222.
25 Rid, Annette, and Ezekiel J. Emanuel. (2014). “Ethical considerations of experimental interven-
tions in the Ebola outbreak.” The Lancet 384.9957: 1896–1899.
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repertoire: screening, surveillance, quarantine, hygiene, and so on. Although they 
are not always uncontroversial, these interventions have been thoroughly tested and 
proven effective. Unfortunately, however, they will not suffice in addressing the 
problem of ABR.26 New methods will need to be explored, which raises the question 
how to determine which intervention is preferable; which offers greater relative 
benefit, and which poses fewer relative risks? The answer to that question depends 
on the evidence available to assess the various interventions. We have no ambition 
here to be complete in listing the possible, but aim to illustrate and map some major 
complexities that arise when balancing the level of precaution against the price of 
precaution.
22.4.1  Biomedical Interventions
A fundamental problem in managing and fighting ABR is the lack of appropriate 
biomedical interventions. One aspect of this is the lack of truly new antibiotics. 
Although there is some progress in the development of novel antibiotics that affect 
Gram-positive bacteria (bacteria with a single outer cell wall),27 innovation for 
Gram-negative bacteria that has reached the market has for decades consisted only 
in variations of the same.28 In part, this can be attributed to the fact that developing 
new antibiotics is relatively unappealing from a business point of view. Therefore 
there is a widely recognized and urgent need to encourage academia and pharma-
ceutical companies to develop new antibiotics, and to facilitate their introduction.29
So-called expedited programs to this effect have been launched, for example by 
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).30 Interventions included in such pro-
grams are priority review, accelerated approval, and fast track (which can be 
combined).31 By promising a swifter, simplified and/or more relaxed process for 
licencing new therapies, such options both offer incentives to industry to invest in 
26 O’Neill, Jim (2014). Antimicrobial resistance: tackling a crisis for the health and wealth of 
nations. Review on antimicrobial resistance.
27 Wright, Gerard. (2015). “Antibiotics: An irresistible newcomer.” Nature 517.7535: 442–444.
28 See, e.g., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. “Antibiotic breakthrough: How to over-
come gram-negative bacterial defenses.” ScienceDaily. www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2017/05/170510132012.htm (accessed July 6, 2017); WHO 2015.
29 World Health Organization, WHO. Global priority list of antibiotic-resistant bacteria to guide 
research, discovery, and development of new antibiotics. Geneva: World Health Organization, 
2017. Online access: http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/global-priority-list-antibiotic-
resistant-bacteria/en (accessed July 28, 2017)
30 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Guidance for Industry. Expedited Programs for 
Serious Conditions – Drugs and Biologics. Washington: USDHHS, 2014. Online access: https://
www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/.../ucm358301.pdf (accessed July 7, 2017). See for a more elabo-
rate discussion: Munthe, C., & Nijsingh, N. (2019). Cutting red tape to manage public health 
threats: An ethical dilemma of expediting antibiotic drug innovation. Bioethics, 33(7), 785–791.
31 https://www.fda.gov/forpatients/approvals/fast/ucm20041766.htm (accessed July 28, 2017)
22 Justifying Antibiotic Resistance Interventions: Uncertainty, Precaution and Ethics
366
the development of new antibiotics, and speed up the introduction of successful 
fruits of such endeavours. Interventions of this sort appear attractive, considering 
the potential damage that lack of development and delay could cause, motivating a 
lower acceptable price of precaution than in the case a “normal” drug development 
context. At the same time, entirely new classes of antibiotics imply elevated uncer-
tainties regarding effect and side effects, pointing to a need for more caution, and 
motivating a higher price of precaution. In addition, problems with regards to the 
control of prescription, use and transmission imply further uncertainties regarding 
the benefits of “expediting” new antibiotics. In particular, it creates a stark tension 
between the overall aim of ABR research and the needs of patients burdened by 
resistant infections. If a new compound is introduced in a setting where the men-
tioned problems have not been mastered, resistance, though inevitable, can be 
expected to develop faster. As a result, there is a relative public health benefit to 
delay the discovery and introduction of new antibiotics while addressing the prob-
lems of ensuring responsible use, and mitigating transmission of resistance. Still, 
earlier introduction may save lives and reduce morbidity of individuals. Therefore, 
it is less clear whether expedited programs for the introduction of new antibiotics 
should be at the top of the priority list. Unless they are combined with effective 
measures to control usage and transmission, they introduce graver uncertainties of 
both negative side effects for patients, and of having the overall aim of managing the 
ABR problem undermined. Below, we will comment on interventions to manage 
this complexity of the ABR challenge.
Another aspect of this challenge is that, if resources are concentrated to this 
effect, it may be possible to develop drugs to take in order to mitigate plasmid- 
mediated transmission of resistant bacteria from one patient to others. These could 
be taken by patients with resistant infections, but also patients who take antibiotics 
where this treatment may otherwise give rise to local resistance. This is a possible 
intervention that is still in a very early stage of exploration,32 which means there will 
be a long and expensive path to any possible actual treatment. At the same time, 
there is an obvious risk that no such success awaits at the other end – creating a 
severe uncertainty with regard to the actual worth of incentive schemes aimed at 
effecting such focused research and development endeavours. In addition, any suc-
cessful treatment of this sort will create an ethical challenge in terms of exposing 
patients to the risk of side effects of the treatment without any sort of potential 
somatic benefit for these same patients. If it is successful, it will have an important 
general primary preventive effect of great public health value in the face of the ABR 
problem. If the introduction of such a drug would be “expedited”, this will at the 
same time increase the risk and uncertainty regarding negative side effects concen-
trated only to those people taking the drug. Weighing these stakes has to be a part of 
striking the balance between what the acceptable price of precaution is to be when 
comparing incentive schemes.
32 See, e.g., Buckner, Michelle, Maria Laura Ciusa, and Laura JV Piddock. (2018). “Strategies to 
combat antimicrobial resistance: anti-plasmid and plasmid curing.” FEMS microbiology reviews.
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Controlling use and transmission is less essential regarding therapeutic interven-
tions where resistance development is not an apparent threat. Phage therapy (the 
therapeutic use of viral strains to attack bacteria) might fall into that category.33 The 
efficacy and safety of phage therapy has not been proven to the stage where it would 
fulfil current guidelines in Europe and the USA. However, it might be that these 
guidelines do not quite suffice in assessing the responsible introduction of phage 
therapy, e.g. since individually designed cocktails may be required for each patient, 
creating an impediment for designing controlled trials. Thus, phage therapy, or 
other innovative solutions that do not (as new antibiotic compounds) feed immedi-
ately into the ABR development problem, may be a better target for “expedited 
programs” from an ABR standpoint  – at least while we lack effective means to 
control use and transmission. On the other hand, accepting the higher degree of 
uncertainty, means lowering the level of required precaution, which may harm 
patients severely if experimental treatments turn out to be unsuccessful.
A more general challenge posed by all types of expediting program interven-
tions, is that they may inadvertently create incentives that give rise to negative 
dynamics regarding drug development. The basic problem is that any expedited 
program creates an incentive for industry to re-direct their research efforts in a way 
that shapes studies to be less stringent and clinically relevant than what they would 
otherwise have been. A well-known example of this is the acceptance of surrogate 
outcome variables (an essential part of accelerated approval interventions), which 
makes it economically attractive for companies to run studies measuring only these, 
meaning that there will be a structural dynamic change of clinical research efforts 
into paths with less potential or without demonstrating actual clinical value. 
Similarly, so-called compassionate use programs have recently come under fire for 
creating a structural incentive for industry to move more and more drug develop-
ment out of the default review process, thus creating a generally decreasing level of 
safety and elevated uncertainty regarding effect. To be sure, expediting programs 
partly aim at having industry thus allocate their efforts and resources, however, if 
there is a structural negative dynamic on the general effectiveness of new drugs, this 
must be viewed as a relevant downside. For that reason, policy makers may want to 
consider other solutions to the issue of drug development, such as rewarding phar-
maceutical companies for developing new antibiotics, for example with exclusivity 
extensions, buyouts and entry prizes.34 Each of these interventions has the potential 
to offer incentives to the pharmaceutical companies, but also to pose risks to society 
33 De Vos, Daniel & Pirnay, Jean-Paul (2015). “Could viruses help resolve the worldwide antibiotic 
crisis?” AMR Control, 110.
34 Seth Seabury Neeraj Sood (2017, May 18). Toward A New Model For Promoting The 
Development Of Antimicrobial Drugs. Health Affairs Blog: http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2017/05/18/toward-a-new-model-for-promoting-the-development-of-antimicrobial-
drugs/(accessed July 28, 2017); Morel, Chantal M., and Elias Mossialos. “Stoking the antibiotic 
pipeline.” BMJ: British Medical Journal (Online) 340. Jim O’Neill (2014) has also suggested a 
´pay or play´ principle, where pharmaceutical companies are required to either contribute or 
pay a fine.
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and individuals, for instance a risk of social backlash.35 There are, of course, also 
large uncertainties regarding whether or not such actions would be money well spent.
Returning to our main question concerning the evidence required for justifying 
various interventions that aim to offer incentives to develop new medicine, we see 
that a trade-off has to be made not just between individual and public interest, but 
also between various levels of uncertainty, and risks of structural negative dynamic 
effects. If faster development of antibiotics comes at the price of faster emergence 
of ABR for those same drugs, this raises the question on how to appreciate the 
urgency of the matter. In particular, it demands that we weigh current ABR against 
possible future ABR and the likelihood of developing alternatives for which ABR 
development is not an issue. There is both a danger of being retrospectively overly 
restrictive in the use of antibiotics when an alternative to the current drugs is found, 
as well as a danger of complacency based on the false reliance on such an alterna-
tive. At the same time, we need to weigh into the balance the apparent but uncertain 
risk of incentive schemes being structurally counterproductive.
22.4.2  Prescription Practices
Since the individual use of antibiotics is an important driver of ABR, interventions 
aiming to control the distribution of antibiotic drugs to individual patients are an 
important part of ABR policy. The proposed interventions include mandating pre-
scription policies (in those countries where this is not already the case), various 
limitations to the type of antibiotics that are made available and improved access 
where antibiotics are currently lacking.
It is a received wisdom that the prescription system is an effective way of con-
trolling the use of drugs. At the same time, the effectiveness on the system may vary, 
depending on numerous factors. For instance, antibiotic prescription practices 
across European regions vary considerably, linked to varying levels of institutional 
corruption.36 Such structural challenges can be assumed to multiply in countries 
where there is no system or culture of effective prescription for antibiotics. Given 
the widespread acceptance of the over-the-counter availability of antibiotics in such 
societies, not only among citizens, but also medical professionals, and sometimes 
policy makers, there is a recognised uncertainty as to the real impact of trying to 
create or toughen up such regulation.37
35 Munthe et al. (2019).
36 Rönnerstrand, Björn, and Victor Lapuente. (2017). “Corruption and use of antibiotics in regions 
of Europe.” Health Policy 121.3: 250–256.
37 Radyowijati, Aryanti, and Hilbrand Haak (2003). “Improving antibiotic use in low-income coun-
tries: an overview of evidence on determinants.” Social science & medicine 57.4 (2003): 733–744. 
Dreser, Anahí, et al. (2012). “Regulation of antibiotic sales in Mexico: an analysis of printed media 
coverage and stakeholder participation.” BMC public health 12.1: 1051.
N. Nijsingh et al.
369
We meet here with a type of uncertainty that is entirely about how societies may 
react to attempted institutional change.38 Weighing into the mix economic, cultural 
and institutional factors of relevance, a more incremental change seems preferable. 
It provides opportunity to attend to the interests of various stakeholders, as well as 
taking the time for a society to adjust, in order to ease both the passing of regulation, 
and its effective implementation. However, that requires quite a bit of knowledge of 
such mechanics of overarching social change, and also uses time itself as a factor. 
This raises the question of how long is long enough to attempt establishing social 
change, and how much effort should be spent on securing the understanding of how 
to make such attempts work. Facing the ABR challenge, how high should the price 
of precaution due to delaying prescription regulative action be allowed to rise while 
attending to such uncertainties?
For countries where a reasonably effective prescription practice is in place, 
unless a patient is critically ill, the first choice of antibiotics is often not the latest, 
most potent formula (with still limited resistance problems). Therefore, antibiotics 
prescribed usually bring a greater risk that the treatment will not cure the infection 
due to resistance. At the same time, this practice serves to protect the future integrity 
of “last line antibiotics” by minimising their use and thereby inhibiting the evolu-
tionary drive towards resistance to them. Most commentators describe the payoff of 
these interventions in terms of public good, whereas risks of implementing them are 
considered to be carried by single individuals.39 However, matters are slightly more 
complex than that. First, although there is agreement that this intervention does 
delay resistance for broad-spectrum compounds, the magnitude of the effect is still 
uncertain. Second, since broad-spectrum antibiotics are more likely to drive resis-
tance in the individual patient’s own gut flora,40 there is also a chance of individual 
benefit linked to prescription practice.
We thus face a complex trade-off situation, where individual risks of suffering 
untreated infections must be balanced against the uncertain prospect that patients 
are protected against being infected by resistant bacteria, at the same time as the 
question remains whether this mix of risk and uncertain benefit for some individuals 
can be justified by a social benefit of uncertain magnitude. This also raises the ques-
tion how much effort should be spent on making sure that the right balance is struck, 
for example by straightening out some of the important uncertainties.
In any case, agreeing that such a practice is indeed justified does not end the 
problem. We must also ask what intervention would actually effectively address it. 
38 The risk of incentive schemes for drug creation to produce unintended negative dynamics via 
their effect on industry in the former section also belongs to this type.
39 Littmann, Jasper, and A. M. Viens. (2015). “The ethical significance of antimicrobial resistance.” 
Public health ethics 8.3: 209–224.
40 This is phenomenon can be observed in urinary tract infections, for example. As the normal non-
resistant invading bacteria of this flora are exterminated by the treatment, a very fertile living space 
is created for bacteria that are resistant against the drug used. Costelloe, Ceire, et al. (2010). “Effect 
of antibiotic prescribing in primary care on antimicrobial resistance in individual patients: system-
atic review and meta-analysis.” Bmj 340: c2096.
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One idea, of course, is to make professional prescription guidelines for doctors to 
use. However, this introduces the uncertainty that doctors may fail to apply them, 
e.g., due to patient pressure, economic counter-incentives, or the mere inertness of 
habit. To address that, there is the option of allowing professionals less choice, for 
example by requiring application to a higher instance and proof of due cause for 
having a prescription green lighted. Such an intervention could consist of several 
levels of requirements, and for some antibiotics regular doctors may be stripped of 
all prescription rights. At the same time, being able to leave professional discretion 
to doctors in individual cases also has its value, and the more of rigid restriction is 
built into an intervention, the bigger the risk that individuals are harmed due to lack 
of (timely) access to treatment. However, rigid regulatory interventions clearly 
avoid the uncertainty with regard to the overall aims of delaying resistance develop-
ment, as well as avoiding harmful individual prescriptions. To make this trade-off, 
it would be of great value to know more about the social dynamics creating the 
uncertainty around the effectiveness of prescription interventions, as well as how 
these might be complemented by additional institutional changes to mitigate the 
pressure on doctors from patients, and to remove economic counter-incentives.41 On 
the other hand, as we delay action, or apply overly cautious interventions with 
uncertain effectiveness while making sure what more exact variant would be best, 
the price of precaution is allowed to go up in terms present prescription practices 
being allowed to continue.
This precautionary challenge is further complicated by the fact that there is an 
instrumental value to fine-tune prescription interventions so that treatment of infec-
tion is optimized also under a restrictive prescription practice. The reason for this is 
that increased persistent infection can be expected to increase the future demand 
and consumption of antibiotics, thereby accelerating rather than mitigating resis-
tance development in the long run.42 Depending on what current prescription prac-
tices look like in specific societies, this may mean that an optimal prescription 
intervention should not only decrease prescription, but in some cases leave it as it is, 
and in yet other even improve the access to antibiotics. Considerations of fairness 
may add further reasons to a similar effect, and also the need of securing the legiti-
macy of any policy in this area. After all, of what interest is the issue of ABR to 
anyone who is barred from accessing appropriate antibiotics in the first place? This 
further complicates the uncertainty about what exact intervention would be most 
effective. But it also adds a basic source of uncertainty with regard to how the 
moral stakes should be balanced in a measure of effectiveness. A sound precaution-
ary solution therefore needs to acknowledge the latter point when striking the bal-
ance between ensuring a desired level of precaution at an acceptable price of 
precaution, and allow both considerations of health promotion and fair distribution 
of the population health.
41 As such changes may involve drastic reform to entire health care and health insurance systems, 
the knowledge required is quite advanced and complicated to collect.
42 Daulaire, N., et al. (2015). “Universal access to effective antimicrobials: an essential feature of 
global collective action against antimicrobial resistance.” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 43.2.
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22.4.3  Surveillance
The fight against ABR also requires enhanced possibilities of diagnosis and surveil-
lance of resistant bacteria. Better diagnostic methods are in themselves unobjection-
able as increased speed, precision and readiness in determining the cause of an 
infection limits the danger of squandering antibiotics. However, there will be trade- 
offs between increasing speed, increasing precision and financial costs and possibly 
the intrusiveness of the sample taking. Because of this, as well as the general uncer-
tainties befalling any new measurement tool, there is once again a challenge to 
decide how much support for the reliability and validity of a new diagnostic tool has 
to be secured in order to start implementing it. The balance here, as before, includes 
assessing the value of more firm knowledge against the price of precaution in terms 
of delaying tools that may also offer opportunities for better surveillance in the face 
of the ABR threat. But it also includes the complications as more speedy introduc-
tion will tend to increase one or the other of well-known downsides to such 
interventions.
These complications become especially challenging as resistant infections or 
even carriership may often actualise restrictive communicable disease management 
measures, such as compulsory isolation, quarantine or mandatory life-style restric-
tions. The implied tension between individual interest and collective good is par-
ticularly salient when this involves asymptomatic carriers, who have nothing to 
benefit from being institutionalized.43 The issue is further complicated when we 
consider the possibility of false positives, where patients are wrongly identified as 
carrying resistant bacteria. As in the former section, this also links to a risk of 
undermining the legitimacy of ABR policies. Thus, while speedy introduction of 
diagnostic methods certainly has its potential upsides, it will increase uncertainties 
of a sort that in other areas are often taken to undermine health surveillance 
programs.
Attempting to strike these several balances, we face the general problem of hav-
ing the right idea concerning the moral stakes involved and a sound notion of what 
price of precaution to allow. In addition, increased complexities of how to assess the 
quality of available and attainable evidence for ambitious and complex public health 
interventions add another layer of uncertainty.44
43 Weinstein, Robert A., Daniel J. Diekema, and Michael B. Edmond. (2007). “Look before you 
leap: active surveillance for multidrug-resistant organisms.” Clinical Infectious Diseases 44.8: 
1101–1107. Nijsingh, N., Juth, N., Munthe, C., “The Ethics of Screening”, in: Quah, Stella 
R. International encyclopedia of public health. Academic Press, 2016. Nijsingh, N., Munthe, C., 
Lindblom, A., & Åhrén, C. (2020). Screening for multi-drug-resistant Gram-negative bacteria: 
what is effective and justifiable?. Monash bioethics review.
44 Attena, (2014).
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22.4.4  Environment and Animals
A wide variety of ABR interventions relate to attempts to curb the emission of anti-
biotics in the environment45 and their use in animals. We have grouped these together 
because of the potential risks of the interventions, which seem mostly economical. 
For example, attempts to enhance transparency of pharmaceutical companies46or 
banning of the use of antibiotics as a growth enhancer,47 or taxing consumer prod-
ucts emanating from ABR driving practices, such as meat production,48 do not have 
direct health risks for humans. Compared to the possible economic damage of such 
interventions, the health risks of ABR may seem to clearly win out. However, there 
is still much uncertainty concerning the role of non-human use and pollution in the 
establishing of ABR and economic cost of interventions carry their own set of sec-
ondary risks and uncertainties, which might be substantial indeed as the incurred 
costs become more significant.
One obvious uncertainty regards the effectiveness of systems of surveillance and 
control of emission rates in production or compound use in farming. These will 
include uncertainties and imprecisions of technical methods, but even more institu-
tional uncertainties of the sort we have already discussed related to prescription and 
surveillance interventions. As already observed, straightening these uncertainties 
out includes coming to grips with very complex social circumstances, and may 
require quite a lot of time and resources.
On top of this, macro-economic ABR interventions targeting environmental 
emission may have adverse effects in themselves, both socially and economically, 
for instance, by discouraging pharmaceutical business and thereby restricting access 
to drugs generally. Consequently, we may legitimately ask which interventions are 
necessary, or reasonable, and which are disproportional, given the uncertain effects 
of current practices. Should, for instance, pharmaceutical companies be required to 
monitor and make sure antibiotics emission from manufacturing are very low?49 Or 
should regulation rather target the pricing of products, adding tax or extra cost in the 
procurement of drugs by public national health services? Or should some other 
45 Pruden, Amy, et al. “Management options for reducing the release of antibiotics and antibiotic 
resistance genes to the environment.” Environmental health perspectives 121.8 (2013): 878.
46 Larsson, DG Joakim, and Jerker Fick. “Transparency throughout the production chain—a way to 
reduce pollution from the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals?.” Regulatory Toxicology and 
Pharmacology 53.3 (2009): 161–163. Nijsingh, N., Munthe, C., & Larsson, D. J. (2019). Managing 
pollution from antibiotics manufacturing: charting actors, incentives and disincentives. 
Environmental Health, 18(1), 95.
47 Laxminarayan, Ramanan, Thomas Van Boeckel, and Aude Teillant. (2015). “The economic costs 
of withdrawing antimicrobial growth promoters from the livestock sector.”.
48 Giubilini, Alberto, et al. (2017). “Taxing Meat: Taking Responsibility for One’s Contribution to 
Antibiotic Resistance.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30.2: 179–198.
49 Bengtsson-Palme, Johan, and DG Joakim Larsson. (2016). “Concentrations of antibiotics pre-
dicted to select for resistant bacteria: Proposed limits for environmental regulation.” Environment 
International 86: 140–149.
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institutional intervention to similar effect be chosen, for example having high emis-
sions in production reduce the calculated health benefit in the context of health 
technology assessment? In all these cases, should the link between detected emis-
sion rates and such incentives be proportionally or more rigidly designed? If the 
former, according to what formula or proportionality, if the latter, on what grounds 
should thresholds be set? And what institutional arrangement would be effective to 
have whatever intervention is chosen to be effectively implemented? Similar ques-
tions appear with regard to interventions aimed at creating incentives to reduce the 
use of antibiotics in farming.50
All of this makes for a considerable difficulty in assessing the proper balancing 
of the level of precaution and its acceptable price. Surely, the urgency of mitigating 
major environmental practices that fuel antibiotic resistance development is a prior-
ity. However, to find the right way of doing this requires quite a bit of very complex 
knowledge, and behind this need lurks the very real risk that a more speedy intro-
duction of interventions is not only sub-optimal, but actually makes the problem 
worse. For instance, implementing any of the regulative interventions mentioned 
may mainly have the effect of having pharmaceutical and food production relocat-
ing to areas where the regulative situation is even worse. Or secondary effects, e.g., 
in the form of drastically increased food prices may both undermine the legitimacy 
of ABR policies and create a public health threat of its own. On the other hand, it is 
well known that it takes considerable time to have large-scale operations such as 
drug production and farming change their longstanding ways, and in the light of 
that, applying interventions to address the environmental side of the ABR challenge 
is paramount.
22.5  Discussion
We have assessed interventions with regard to how much and what kind of evidence 
is needed when evaluating and implementing interventions in response to antibiotic 
resistance, a public health threat of immense proportions. The notion of responsible 
precautionary decision-making provides a basic and strong reason to act in response 
to this threat. However, determining what response to go for introduces complex 
problems of balancing what level of precaution to aim for and what price of precau-
tion to pay, actualising much more difficult ethical challenges than what is often 
acknowledged.
We end this exploration by briefly addressing two issues that emerge when we 
consider the evidence for interventions that aim to fight antibiotic resistance, lead-
ing into a final broad suggestion for future analyses to build on.
50 Silley, Peter, and Bernd Stephan. (2017). “Prudent use and regulatory guidelines for veterinary 
antibiotics—politics or science?.” Journal of applied microbiology 123.6: 1373–1380.
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First, there is the sheer size of the possible consequences of increased ABR. For 
example, there is a real question whether standards of treatment and diagnosis in 
research ethics and clinical ethics may need revision in light of a public health threat 
as significant to global wellbeing as ABR. Although one should be wary to discard 
too easily the frameworks that have proven to be of value throughout the years, the 
possible disruptive effects of ABR raise the issue to what extent these standards can 
be maintained, given the range of difficult choices we might face. At the same time, 
we have seen that many of the uncertainties posed by ABR interventions are not so 
much about having risks of undesirable side effects as such are typically conceived 
of when evaluating pharmaceuticals. Rather, the important uncertainties are about 
risks of outright counterproductivity due to social psychological and institutional 
dynamics, where apparently promising attempts to counter ABR may instead lure 
us into political, economic or psychological dead ends from which we are unable to 
get out. Social processes are typically slow, variably inert and intractable, which 
means also that they may be very difficult to reverse, and that doing so may require 
a lot of time. Given that interventions on all of the mentioned levels are probably 
necessary to reduce the risk of emerging resistance and that they are to a large extent 
interrelated, the standards of evidence should be set from an integrated, One Health 
perspective.
This connects to the general observation that methods in response to ABR have 
to intervene on a variety of different levels, from the everyday practice of physicians 
to those affecting global structures. Interventions worthy of consideration therefore 
involve a myriad of different types and degrees of uncertainty and risks, which are 
also unevenly distributed across people, societies and time. Assessment of the evi-
dence thus needs to consider a multi-layered mosaic of uncertainties and ethical 
dilemmas regarding the short- and long-term trade-off between individual interests 
and public health aims. This regards especially the issue of how much and what 
evidence to collect regarding the effectiveness of interventions, and their potential 
long-term legitimacy.
These considerations may drive one to despair whether a responsible, measured 
approach to the issues at play here is at all feasible. One way of moving forward in 
the light of these considerations is to acknowledge that there are good – moral and 
precautionary – reasons to cut the Gordian knot: just as there is a question of how 
much to amass and ponder evidence and the proper resolution of ethical dilemmas, 
we must not get stuck forever in the precautionary conundrum. Moving along such 
a path, one primary consideration is then to assess the relative importance of avoid-
ing harm and risk of harm that result from otherwise apparently effective interven-
tion packages, while avoiding the pull of the enormity of the ABR challenge to lure 
us into policy deadlocks. In doing so, the complexity and close connections of the 
various risks offer strong grounds for putting the reversibility of potential adverse 
consequences at centre stage. Related to debates on the ethics of precaution, this 
links to different proposals on how to limit the scope of a precautionary principle, 
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e.g., in terms of de minimis risk, and, more specifically, to the importance of avoid-
ing irreversible negative outcomes. This is not to say that this is a generally plausi-
ble solution for all precautionary decision-making, but the peculiar complex 
challenges of assessing evidence for ABR interventions seem to add reasons for the 
fittingness of an approach that prioritises reversibility.51
51 This research was supported by the UGOT Challenges Initiative at the University of Gothenburg; 
and by the Swedish Research Coucil, VR, contract no. 2014–40, for the Lund-Gothenburg 
Responsibility Project.
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